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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 Nos. 09-3952 & 10-3068 
 ___________ 
 
 SHAO JIE HUANG, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petitions for Review of Orders of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A088-996-356) 
 Immigration Judge:  Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed April 7, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Shao Jie Huang seeks review of final orders issued by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petitions for review. 
 Because the parties are familiar with the background, we will present it here only 
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briefly.  Huang is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and is from Fujian 
Province.  He arrived in the United States in May 2007.  In September 2007, he applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).  He was later charged with removability for being an alien present without 
being admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer.  Huang conceded 
removability. 
 In November 2008, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) conducted a hearing on Huang’s 
claim of persecution concerning China’s restrictive family planning laws.  Huang 
testified that he and his wife had their first child, a daughter, in July 2005.  Under the 
government’s policy, they were permitted to have a second child five years later.  In the 
meantime, following their daughter’s birth, government officials took Huang’s wife to 
the hospital to have an intra-uterine device (“IUD”) inserted to prevent pregnancy.  She 
was required to report for gynecological checkups every few months.  Huang’s wife 
secretly had a private doctor remove the IUD, and she became pregnant a few months 
later, in December 2006.  To avoid detection by the family planning authorities, she and 
her daughter went into hiding at Huang’s grandmother’s house.  In January 2007, 
officials came to Huang’s home to take his wife to her checkup, but Huang made excuses 
for her absence.  The officials threatened him with forced sterilization and a fine.  The 
pregnancy was their second violation of the family planning laws, the first having 
occurred when Huang’s wife already was pregnant with their first child when they 
registered their marriage.  Huang stated that they wish to have more children.  He feared 
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that, if the pregnancy were discovered, his wife would be forced to have an abortion and 
would be subjected to a forced sterilization.  If she delivered the child, they would not be 
able to add the child to the household registry.  After discussing the matter, the couple 
decided to terminate the pregnancy in February 2007, feeling that they had no choice but 
to do so. 
 Huang left for the United Sates shortly after the termination of the second 
pregnancy.  The authorities in China never learned of his wife’s second pregnancy; she 
had an IUD reinserted and continued to attend her periodic checkups.  She and their 
daughter remained in China.  Huang acknowledged that he and his wife are permitted to 
have another child.  He stated that they wish to have at least three more children, but he 
believes that one of them would be forced to undergo sterilization after having a second 
child. 
 The IJ denied all forms of relief and ordered Huang removed to China.  On 
September 14, 2009, the BIA dismissed Huang’s appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s 
conclusions that Huang had not met his burden of proof on his asylum and withholding 
claims and also did not establish eligibility for CAT relief.  Specifically, the BIA 
concurred with the IJ’s determination that Huang’s wife’s IUD insertions were 
insufficient to establish an asylum claim, that Huang is precluded from basing his asylum 
claim on his wife’s abortion, and that his claims of past persecution regarding the 
payment of a fine and fear of future persecution based on the possibility of having 
another child were based on conjecture and speculation.  The BIA also found that Huang 
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failed to meet the more stringent burden of proof for withholding of removal.  Further, 
the BIA agreed with the IJ’s conclusion that Huang failed to establish eligibility for CAT 
relief, noting that Huang failed to establish that each step of a hypothetical chain of 
events is more likely than not to occur. 
 In December 2009, Huang filed with the BIA a motion to reopen his case to file a 
successive asylum application based on previously unavailable evidence.  In support, he 
asserted that in May 2009, family planning officials imposed on his wife a fine of RMB 
11,800, for their prior violation of the family planning policy.  The officials threatened 
sterilization of Huang’s wife and removal of their daughter from the household 
registration if the fine remained unpaid after three months.  Huang noted that his wife 
protested that she and Huang already had paid a fine of RMB 3,000, to no avail.  Huang 
further stated that officials came to the house every two weeks to ask for payment.  With 
financial assistance from friends, Huang gave the money to his father (a United States 
permanent resident) to take with him during a visit to China; his father gave the money to 
Huang’s wife, who then paid the fine on August 28, 2009.  The officials warned that if 
the couple violated the policy again, one of them would be sterilized and another heavy 
fine would be assessed.  Huang stated his fear of forced sterilization or imposition of a 
heavy fine if he and his wife were to have a second child.  With his motion to reopen, 
Huang submitted a new asylum application and statement.  He also submitted exhibits, 
which included a letter and identity documents from his father, a receipt for the payment 
of the new fine, and a letter and identity documents from neighbors in China who also 
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had to pay a fine under similar circumstances.  On June 24, 2010, the BIA denied the 
motion to reopen, noting that the documents from China had not been authenticated under 
8 C.F.R. § 1287.6, and that Huang had not established the authenticity of the documents 
in an alternative manner.  The BIA held that the evidence was insufficient to show that 
Huang would be subjected to economic harm amounting to persecution or that he would 
be subject to forcible sterilization, and that Huang thus failed to show a realistic chance 
of establishing eligibility for relief to warrant reopening. 
 Huang filed timely petitions for review regarding both of the BIA’s decisions, and 
the matters have been consolidated in this Court for disposition.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  The BIA agreed with the IJ’s decision and added its own 
reasoning, and thus, we review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.  See Sandie v. 
Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the agency’s factual 
determinations under the substantial evidence standard.  See id. at 251.  The agency’s 
findings are considered conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  We exercise de novo 
review over the agency’s legal decisions.  See Sandie, 455 F.3d at 251.  We apply the 
abuse of discretion standard to our review of the BIA’s denial of Huang’s motion to 
reopen.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft,  290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  Applying that 
standard, Huang must show that the BIA’s denial of his motion was somehow arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.  See id. 
 Huang acknowledges this Court’s decision in Lin-Zheng v. Attorney General, 
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557 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2009), and that there is no automatic refugee status accorded to 
spouses of individuals who have been forced to undergo an abortion.  However, under 
Lin, spouses remain eligible for relief if they qualify as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) based upon their own persecution, or well-founded fear of persecution, for 
“other resistance” to a coercive population control program.  See id. at 157.  Huang 
argues that the BIA failed to assess whether he established eligibility for asylum in his 
own right.  For example, Huang argues that he suffered past persecution in light of the 
fine imposed for the first pregnancy, the threat that he would be sterilized while his wife 
was in hiding, and the severe emotional harm he suffered when his wife had an abortion.  
The BIA did not ignore his arguments.  Instead, in its decision, the BIA referred to that 
portion of his brief addressing those claims on appeal and rejected his arguments as 
unpersuasive.  It also specifically considered and rejected Huang’s argument that the 
3,000 RMB fine constituted persecution. 
 Moreover, the record does not compel a finding that Huang suffered past 
persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his “other 
resistance” to China’s family planning policies.  Persecution includes “threats to life, 
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to 
life or freedom.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, it “does not 
encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or 
unconstitutional.”  Id.   Concerning the RMB 3,000 fine, although “the deliberate 
imposition of severe economic disadvantage which threatens a petitioner’s life or 
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freedom may constitute persecution,” Li v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 400 F.3d 157, 168 (3d 
Cir. 2005), Huang did not show that the fine rose to that level.  As the BIA noted, 
Huang’s assertion that the fine was particularly onerous was based not on his own 
financial situation but instead on the supposition that the fine probably exceeded his 
annual income--an assumption based on his young age at the time of the fine and a rural 
net income figure published in a State Department China report.  As for the threat that 
Huang would be sterilized if his wife did not report for her examination, we are not 
compelled by the record to conclude that BIA erred in deciding that the evidence for that 
claim is too speculative to be credited.  Nor can we say that the record compels the 
conclusion that, contrary to the BIA’s judgment, Huang has established persecution in his 
own right, based on his wife’s abortion.  Concerning Huang’s claimed fear of future 
persecution if he and his wife were to have a second child in the future and would want 
additional children, we are not persuaded that the agency erred in finding the claim to be 
speculative.  The record contains evidence that Huang and his wife have one child and 
are in compliance with family planning laws, and that they would be permitted to have 
another child under local policy. 
 Because Huang was ineligible for asylum, we also agree that he was unable to 
meet the higher standard applicable to applications for withholding of removal.  See 
Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2008).  As for his CAT claim, 
although Huang asserts generally that he is eligible for relief based on the evidence, he 
identifies no record support for his position and makes no specific challenge to the 
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agency’s decision on this point.  We conclude that he has not shown that he is entitled to 
CAT relief. 
 We now turn to the BIA’s denial of Huang’s motion to reopen.  Motions to reopen 
are reserved for only “compelling circumstances.”  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 
561 (3d Cir. 2004).  A motion to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for relief, 
that is, a reasonable likelihood of establishing entitlement to relief, upon review of 
evidence accompanying the motion as well as record evidence.  See id. at 563 and n.7 
(citing Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 173 n.5.  Such showing notwithstanding, the BIA “has 
discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima 
facie case for relief.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). 
 Huang argues that the BIA erred in discounting the evidence solely because the 
evidence was not authenticated pursuant to the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6.  In its 
decision, the BIA recognized that the failure to authenticate pursuant to § 1287.6 is not an 
automatic rule of exclusion.  See Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Although the BIA noted that Huang did not prove authenticity of the evidence in another 
manner, and although Huang now protests that he should not have been faulted for failing 
to authenticate his documents, the BIA did not exclude the evidence from consideration 
and did not solely rely on the lack of authentication in denying Huang’s motion to 
reopen.  Rather, it also relied on Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, (BIA 2007), for the 
proposition that a showing of economic sanctions does not amount to persecution where 
the record contains little information concerning the respondent’s own financial situation.  
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Huang argued in his motion to reopen that the two separate fines amounted to two to 
three times the annual income of his family while he was living in China, but he pointed 
to no particular evidence in the record of his income or net worth at the time the second 
fine was imposed, which occurred while he was living and working in the United States.
1
  
We discern no abuse of discretion here. 
 Huang also challenges the BIA’s statement that the evidence does not indicate that 
Huang would be subject to forced sterilization in China.  He argues that the BIA ignored 
the portion of the State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 
China, 2006, that indicates that forced sterilizations do occur in China, in Fujian Province 
in particular.  See Pet’r. Brief at 13 (citing C.A. No. 10-3086 J.A. 306.)  Because the 
Report on the cited page states that officials in Fujian Province reportedly forcibly 
sterilized women, the statement provides little support for Huang’s position that he would 
subject to forced sterilization for a violation of the family planning laws, and the BIA’s 
failure to consider that portion of the evidence thus does not appear to have been arbitrary 
or irrational.  As the BIA noted in its decision, the Report also lists punishments such as 
fines, adverse job-related consequences, expulsion from the party, and destruction of 
property were applied to violators of the family planning laws in China.  Although the 
Report also states that one parent was often pressured to undergo sterilization in cases 
                                                 
1
 At the hearing before the IJ in 2008, Huang testified that he was employed as a 
kitchen worker in the United States.  At the time of the hearing, he had been working for 
about thirteen months and was earning about $10,000 per year.  (C.A. No. 09-3952 J.A. 
149.) 
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where the family already had two children, Huang and his wife have only one child.  In 
sum, Huang does not point to evidence that shows that the BIA abused its discretion in 
finding that Huang failed to demonstrate a realistic likelihood that he can establish 
eligibility for asylum on his claim, or that the BIA’s decision was arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law. 
 We will deny the petitions for review. 
 
